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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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measure of international fame in 1949 when he was expelled from Hungary by the Communists after they charged that he served as the intermediary between Hungarian Cardinal Mindszenty and the U.S. Minister to Budapest.

Koczak began to have his \$18,000 a year job pulled out from under him while serving as head of the political section reporting on Communist East Germany in Berlin in 1960-61. Involved against Koczak are persons directly connected with the notorious "Warsaw sex and spy cases" including the celebrated Scarbeck-Discher scandal. Scarbeck, it will be remembered, was second secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, Poland. After being surprised in bed with his mistress, Scarbeck agreed to collaborate with the Polish Government. It was here, too, that the marine guard was compromised by female, Communist intelligence officers and the Embassy thoroughly bugged by the Communists.

Koczak came to Berlin in 1960 following a promotion and assignment for the State Department after "brilliant" work in Israel where he was stationed during the Suez crisis of 1955. He was made head of the political section as well as Deputy Chief of Eastern Affairs at the U.S. mission in Berlin.

Koczak's immediate superior was Thomas A. Donovan, who was reportedly transferred to Berlin in September of 1960 because of allegations made by U.S. marine guards who implicated him in illicit associations with Polish women suspected of being Polish agents. Ranking as head of the U.S. mission and the superior of both men was E. Allan Lightner, later Ambassador of Libya and now Deputy Commandant of the National War College. In between Lightner and Donovan was Howard Trivers.

Following his sudden transfer, Donovan still kept ties with Warsaw. Koczak frequently traveled from West Berlin into East Berlin on official trips. His boss, Donovan, would go with him. From East Berlin, Koczak discovered that Donovan would place calls to Communists in Warsaw. These calls were never reported by Donovan to colleagues in West Berlin, nor were they reported to Ambassador Jacob Beam in Warsaw, the receiving end.

Koczak's career as a Foreign Service officer started toward its end when, in addition to the phone calls, Donovan made an unauthorized trip to Warsaw at the exact time when Khrushchev aided by the Polish Government, launched his drive to expel the United States from Berlin. This was too much for Koczak who reported the breaches of security and of orders to Howard Trivers, deputy chief of the mission in West Berlin and Donovan's superior.

By asking Trivers to bring to the attention of Ambassador Beam the phone calls and the unauthorized trip of Donovan, what Koczak termed the "exceptional circumstances of my superior's—Donovan's—telephone calls and his unauthorized trip to Warsaw," Koczak was rewarded with an exceptionally low efficiency rating.

Koczak has stated that he chose going over his boss' head with the problem after facing this dilemma: if he kept

silent about the clandestine trip and phone calls, he might be party to a security risk; if he chose to talk with Trivers, he would be a "squealer." Ironically, nothing happened. There was no reaction from Trivers, so Koczak decided to go even one higher, to Lightner. But, to his dismay, both Trivers and Lightner advanced the argument that Donovan had taken advantage of lower telephone rates in East Berlin. Presumably, there was no justification advanced for the unauthorized trip and this item was merely suppressed.

Characteristically, Koczak learned that Trivers had not informed Ambassador Beam of Donovan's activities, and had even failed to inform Lightner.

Information compiled in the years since have indicated that Koczak was definitely up against one of the cliques within the State Department and it was probably futile to attempt to maintain good security if it meant danger to an "insider."

Although Koczak had been in the top 10 percent of the personnel, Donovan gave him the low rating in 1961 and an even lower rating in 1962. Koczak was told in March 1963 that he had been "selected out", in his case, retired. Although he fought for and gained reinstatement, the State Department came back in 1964 with another, and final decree which even letters to the President could not overrule.

The security involved in Donovan's calls and visits to Warsaw, and the fact that nothing was done about the breach, indicates the overriding considerations which insiders can use to shore up the failings of one of their boys.

While Koczak was retired, Donovan was given a good assignment in the Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research, even in the face of serious charges that he was implicated in the Warsaw scandal—and therefore shipped to Berlin—and subsequently continued his contacts with the Polish Communists. It has been reported also that while in Warsaw, Donovan's apartment was "bugged" by Polish intelligence, Soviet intelligence, and even the CIA.

In addition to Donovan's continuation in State positions, Trivers and Lightner are also going their merry ways; Trivers is now the consul general in Zurich and Lightner Deputy Commandant at the National War College.

The reasons why Donovan was not fired after his Warsaw escapades, and why Trivers, Lightner, and Ambassador Beam run such similarly loose ships, can only be that they are a few of the insiders. It has been pointed out that Beam, Lightner, and Trivers all graduated from Princeton within a year of each other. In fact, common usage has come to identify one of the cliques in the State Department as the "Henderson-Princeton pack." The Henderson here is the former Under Secretary for Administration, Loy Henderson, who is supposed to have engineered the reassignment of Donovan from Warsaw to Berlin following a request to this effect from Trivers and Lightner.

Although Koczak has come up against the power of this inside group, he also appears to have caused another faction

dire concern; this group having the title of the "Macy-Crockett camp."

The security problems posed by these self-promoting groups are obvious. Less obvious is the problem of poor policy judgments which can be fostered by excluding some officers or, at the least, disregarding their individual judgments. Again, the case of Stephen Koczak as an example.

Koczak, in his position as political officer, predicted that the Berlin wall was going to be built, and presumably passed his predictions—with justifications—on to his superiors. On August 12 Koczak was talking with a news correspondent and stated that he would not be surprised if the Communists began the wall the next day. It would seem that while the administration was shocked when the wall did go up the next day, Koczak's information should have mediated this blow. Granted, luck was involved but there was also sound judgment and efficient, if not brilliant, work behind the statement. One can only assume that the clique did not approve in some way and the information was never passed on or properly examined.

Few will ever know what action might have been taken had the Berlin wall been planned for and an effective countermeasure ready.

At the center of the Koczak case is the misuse of the efficiency report system, now expanded to include the so-called development appraisal report. In the past it has been a secret item, and in Koczak's case he charges that his records were manipulated to such an extent—in attempts to justify his selection out after years of service in the top 10 percent—that its contents were in part destroyed, forgeries made and backdated and then substituted for originals. In addition, Koczak charges that his file contained a statement that he had read the full report when, in fact, he had not.

The newer development appraisal report has been made available to the individual concerned only since June 1967, and this action by the State Department came only after pressure from the American Federation of Government Employees which stated more than a year and a half ago that the report was startling, dangerous and secretive. But even now the report can be seen only in Washington and even at that, the writer cannot be confronted by the person who may be charged. For the Foreign Service officer overseas, it may be years before he even sees his report. This assumes that State will continue to allow officers to read the report even under these highly limited conditions.

Add to this the fact that the development appraisal report is today the principal criterion on which promotion or selection out is based. Here again are Mr. Griner's statements, this time on the report and the selection boards which pass judgment. As can be seen, not only is the report an atrocious weapon, but the horror is compounded by the built-in inadequacies of the selection board:

We have also carefully examined the methods, procedures, and composition of the Selection Boards which rate officers for "selection out" as well as promotion. At the outset we wish to call attention to the fact that the Boards are primarily composed of For-

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sign Service Officers whose own future assignments, careers and promotions may very well depend on the way they perform on these Selection Panels. This alone is itself already a situation which needs safeguards through an appeals procedure to prevent bias and favoritism. Not only is the composition of the Panels a matter of criticism, but the Board's procedures are unsystematic, haphazard, and we believe, unenlightened. We are told that hundreds of efficiency records, each containing up to as many as twenty individual annual and other reports, are assembled for each Panel. To these are added further hundreds of so-called Development Appraisal Reports, whose illegal institution we have already condemned in the past. Moreover, none of the Development Appraisal Reports written in the past three years were seen, we wish to note, at the time of writing by the Officers; many have not been seen in the interval. Some may never be seen by the officers being rated.

All this vast assemblage of unseen, unsystematic material is given to the respective Panel for each class; each of the five or six Panel members then proceeds to $\frac{1}{5}$ or $\frac{1}{6}$ of these heaps of records, sorting them into three piles—one pile, usually approximately ten per cent, is accumulated for persons tentatively considered for promotion; one pile, also usually approximately ten per cent, is for Officers tentatively considered for "selection out." And a third pile, usually seventy five to eighty per cent, is put away not to be read again unless some special message comes from the personnel office suggesting the re-reading of certain files. These will be neither promoted nor "selected out" that year.

Comments we have received from Panel members indicate that dreariness, boredom, and fatigue soon overtakes them. None of the persons being rated ever appears individually—the names thus are faceless. No one knows for sure whether the reports themselves are accurate or not. No one can even meaningfully ask whether the reports are authentic, or, as one person has publicly charged, whether they sometimes contain even forgeries.

It is important that Stephen Koczak have his day in court against his accusers, but his case points up more than just one man fighting the establishment. It also reveals the "system." It is this system within the State Department which must be the target of Congress, and it is through elimination of this system that the Government and the people served will gain better foreign policy, tighter security, surer personnel practices, all through better men allowed to work in a clean, competitive environment.

OTHER U.S. CASES

If the State Department would expend as much energy in ridding its ranks of security risks as it has in the Otepka and Koczak cases, the Philbys and Macleans might not be such importance. Clark Mollenhoff, the Pulitzer Prize winning reporter for the Des Moines, Iowa, Register and one of America's most fearless reporters, listed 14 cases in the Register of October 4, 1967, wherein violations of security procedures were charged. Here again it must be stressed that security risks are not confined to Communist affiliations or sympathies alone. Issuing of false statements, immoral conduct, homosexuality, intoxication, and mental defects are bases for adverse security judgments. Among the violations mentioned by Mollenhoff are these:

1. A security officer stationed in Athens, Greece, who failed to report a large number of security violations yet was appointed dep-

uty chief of the Division of Security Evaluations at the State Department.

2. A security officer who withheld information from his superiors concerning the loss of classified documents by an American ambassador. The officer was not censured and was promoted to be a top lieutenant of Reilly.

3. A security officer stationed in Moscow who permitted himself to be enticed into the apartment of a Russian woman, an agent for the secret police. The secret police used concealed cameras to photograph the American and his nude companion and tried to get him to spy for the Soviet Union. He never was criticized or disciplined.

4. A foreign service officer who admitted to security officers and State Department medical authorities that he had engaged in homosexual acts. The medical officers found him unfit to serve abroad because in their judgment his homosexual tendencies made him a potential security risk. He was sent abroad, however, and was assigned to a critical post behind the Iron Curtain.

5. A foreign service officer stationed in Mexico and Caracas, Venezuela, who was guilty of a series of incidents of sexual misconduct, including an affair with the wife of the ambassador of another nation. His conduct was excused by State Department politicians.

6. A man dismissed as a security risk by the Mutual Security Agency and characterized as having "a rotten file," who was appointed to a State Department position and given full security clearance.

7. A foreign service officer who admitted he furnished 18 documents, some of them classified "secret" to Philip Jaffe, the publisher of Amerasia magazine and on whom there was a considerable record of Communist activities and affiliation. The officer was permitted to take an honorable retirement and pension.

In two other cases mentioned by Mollenhoff the subjects are still with the State Department. In one case the Foreign Service officer concealed the fact that he had been a member of the Young Communist League and the Communist Party. In the other case a Foreign Service officer stationed in an eastern European post admitted homosexual tendencies and other personal misconduct but was given responsibility for supervising the Marine guard personnel and protecting all safe combinations at the American Embassy. His negligence permitted foreign agents to have access to classified reports at the Embassy. He was not disciplined, received normal promotions, and like the other case listed above, he is still with the State Department.

In connection with security risks at the State Department it is only fair to state that each year this subject is reviewed by the House Appropriations Subcommittee which reviews State's appropriations requests. Each year State provides the number of employees who have departed from the Department for security reasons of various types. However, the testimony before the subcommittee is briefly dealt with, as it must be, because of the very large volume of work handled by the subcommittee. The number of risks per year is not the prime consideration here, for how can one measure the value of one Philby or Maclean in terms of lesser security risks. What is important is the nature of the present security system with its downgrading of strict security precautions, the waiving of security checks for questionable persons, and the elimination of hardheaded employees who place na-

tional security above Department pressures.

Concerning the above-mentioned subcommittee and its annual inquiry into the security risks in the State Department, the Government Employees' Exchange reported in its issue of July 26 of this year that reference to one "admitted homosexual" was omitted in testimony before the subcommittee earlier this year. This officer was included on the 1967 Foreign Service promotion list and his promotion to a FSO-1 was confirmed by the U.S. Senate.

Another account of this case was placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on November 3 by the gentleman from Iowa, Congressman H. R. Gross. This account by Clark Mollenhoff, of the Des Moines Register, reports that the officer had admitted his deviations to security officers and that a State Department medical team warned that as a "latent homosexual" he should not be placed in any position where sensitive security matters are handled. In answer to a congressional inquiry State replied that the man had "a valid clearance, and is not currently under investigation." According to the Government Employees' Exchange, this case has been referred to the appropriate committee, and I am hopeful that the circumstances surrounding this case will be brought to public attention and corrective action taken.

THE ROSTOW CASE

Another case which has a direct bearing on security matters is that of Walt W. Rostow, now a special assistant to the President on national security affairs. According to various press accounts just recently, Rostow was refused a security clearance three times in the 1950's. Rostow, in turn, stated, according to the Washington Post and Evening Star that:

From 1951 onward, I had continuous security clearance from various agencies of the Federal Government.

Senator STROM THURMOND noted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of October 19 that Rostow's reply was not "responsive to the allegations presented by Mr. Otto Otepka in his brief filed recently before a State Department hearing." It is claimed that Rostow was initially rejected for a high-level clearance by the Department of the Air Force; and again in 1955 by Herbert Hoover, Jr., then Under Secretary of State; and again in 1957 by Roderick O'Connor, then Administrator of the State Department Bureau of Security. Senator THURMOND pointed out:

Anyone who knows anything about security clearances knows they are granted for various degrees of accessibility and by various agencies. The standards of each agency may be, and frequently are, entirely different; and they may be bypassed completely by high-level command.

Senator THURMOND further observed that:

Whatever level of clearance he may have had, the fact is that he has been denied strict high-level clearance on the three occasions mentioned. For example: under the Hoover action of 1955, Rostow was disapproved to attend meetings of a psychological warfare panel of the Operations Coordinating Board—OCB—which operates directly under the jurisdiction of the National Security

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Council. This is, of course, a very high level, critical clearance.

This is not the first time that Rostow's clearance has been questioned. In June 1962, Everett S. Allen, staff writer for the New Bedford, Mass., Standard-Times and winner of a National Headliners Award for outstanding achievement in journalism in 1959, had a series of eight articles, entitled "What's Wrong With the State Department?" published in the Standard-Times. The series was the result of 18 months of investigation and interview and was shortly thereafter inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by the gentleman from Massachusetts, Congressman HASTINGS KERRH. Concerning Rostow, Allen stated in article No. 7:

A well-informed former State Department official, with more than a quarter-century's experience with the Federal Government, made certain statements to me regarding the professional qualifications of Walt W. Rostow.

Allen went to the State Department and placed these statements before them in the form of questions. The substance of State's reply was, in Allen's words:

There is no record of any denial of security clearance by the State Department security office or by an undersecretary in a previous Administration. The department felt it was not appropriate to comment further on what happened in a previous Administration.

As was mentioned above, Herbert Hoover, Jr., was Under Secretary of State in 1955, and it was he, according to the Otepka brief, that denied to Rostow the high level security clearance to attend OCB meetings. It would appear then that if the charges of three security rejections against Rostow are true, then "an undersecretary in a previous administration" was definitely involved, contrary to the above statement by the State Department.

WHAT'S TO BE DONE

It is quite evident that the task of enforcing strict security regulations on executive agencies is primarily one for Congress. By means of investigation and legislation changes can be made as in the case of the National Security Agency several years ago. It will be recalled that when two NSA employees, Bernon Mitchell and William Martin, turned up in Moscow as traitors, the House Committee on Un-American Activities uncovered evidence that far more was involved than just the fact that two NSA employees had defected to the U.S.S.R. With the purpose of strengthening security laws and in performance of its legislative oversight authority, the committee launched an investigation of NSA security practices which consumed 2,000 man-hours of its investigators' time, and which covered 15 States, resulting in a total of 16 separate executive hearings. The outcome of the committee's effort was the initiation of 22 corrective security steps on the part of NSA. Legislation was drawn up based on the committee's recommendations and is now Public Law 88-290. NSA's Director of Personnel, who had falsified information on his form 57 and then covered it up, resigned and the dismissal of 26 individuals because of sexual deviation was effected. The committee's annual report for 1961 stated in part:

Former investigators for agencies which conduct background inquiries of NSA employees told of homosexuals and sex deviates within the Agency. They related how difficult it was to check on some NSA personnel because often the only references given by employees were personal friends or fellow employees.

The report then cited a condition which could well be applied to cases in the State Department:

The most outspoken complaint against NSA by former investigators, however, was that occasionally, prior to the committee's investigation, when derogatory information was uncovered during background investigations, responsible officials in the Office of Security Services ignored it.

The similarity to the State Department lies in the fact that security precautions were ignored, both here and abroad. Worse still, some of those who undertook to enforce strict security procedures were subject to various devices calculated to remove them from their positions.

The most recent and comprehensive investigation of security at the State Department was carried out by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Had it not been for the persistent efforts of this body, and Otepka's refusal to make a "deal" with State, much of the information now made public would have gone uncovered. On November 6 of last year, after the subcommittee had released the 20th part of its hearings on State Department Security, Willard Edwards, the Chicago Tribune's experienced Washington reporter, stated:

The subcommittee, it was learned, is now working on a report which will draw conclusions and make recommendations based on the 1,500,000 words of testimony it took in the Otepka case. The task is enormous and will take months. The eventual report will be from 50,000 to 100,000 words in length. All indications point to a historic paper, an account of intrigue designed to destroy a government official and a high-level administration conspiracy to frustrate a Senate subcommittee's investigation of the affair.

A number of months before the subcommittee had completed its hearings, Senator JAMES EASTLAND introduced S. 3388 which was designed to correct a number of security problems at the State Department which were revealed during the hearings. Cosponsoring the bill were Senators DODD, DIRSKEN and HRUSKA, indicating the bipartisan nature of this issue. Here are the nine provisions of the legislation:

First. Guarantee continued existence of the Passport Office and Visa Office, and provide against abolition of the position of Director of either Office.

Second. Assure the Office of Security will be staffed by professional security officers, under civil service. Foreign Service officers will not investigate or evaluate each other for security purpose.

Third. Guarantee that all evaluative functions in personnel security will be performed by professional security officers trained in evaluations, within Evaluations Division of the Office of Security.

Fourth. Require that a copy of any document transmitted to the State Department by the FBI or CIA and marked

for the attention of the Secretary, must be transmitted immediately and directly to the Secretary's office, flagged for his personal attention.

Fifth. Provide that no Foreign Service officer or other employee of the State Department having any responsibility to, or subject to any orders or instructions from, any other agency of Government may be concerned in any way with (a) policymaking, or (b) administration of any function of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs or the Office of Security, or any other security function of the Department of State.

Sixth. Direct that all field investigations in State Department personnel security cases are to be conducted by an agency other than State—except that interrogations may continue to be made by State Department officers abroad.

Seventh. Assure that no State Department employee shall be prohibited from communicating directly or indirectly, orally or in writing, with Members or committees of the Congress.

Eighth. Establish legal requirement for security clearances of all U.S. nationals for employment with international organizations.

Ninth. Write into law the present provision of State Department Security Regulations prohibiting reinstatement or reemployment of a Foreign Service officer or other officer or employee of the Department discharged for security reasons.

There can be no doubt that the Congress alone must act to improve security and personnel policies in Government agencies such as the Department of State. The need for congressional action exists but along side this need are the duty and mandate deriving from the investigative and legislative functions. As in the NSA case mentioned above, Congress can do the job. The machinery for doing it exists through presently constituted committees and subcommittees of both the House and the Senate.

A beginning must be made and I believe that Senator EASTLAND's bill, S. 3388, is that beginning. Although it is only the first step it does state nine demanding points which should be covered. To this same end I have introduced complementary legislation, the same bill, on the House side. Investigation and disclosure are helpful and necessary but they are merely a demand for legislation; they can serve as diagnosis but only legislation can effect a cure.

(Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. ASHBROOK'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

HALLUCINOGENIC DRUGS MUST BE CONTROLLED

(Mr. BROTZMAN (at the request of Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BROTZMAN. Mr. Speaker, Congress has an excellent record of provid-

ing Federal enforcement agencies with whatever authority is needed to protect the American people—and particularly our youth—from the consequences of drug abuse.

History shows that there always has been a small element in our midst which will fight for the individual "right" of self-corruption by drug use. Opium had its champions, and so have heroin and marihuana.

Fortunately for our Nation, this lobby of permissiveness, which seems to be made up of both the vicious and the misguided, has made little headway in Congress. We have stood firm against repeated demands that penalties for illicit drug sales and use be softened or repealed.

But, unfortunately for our Nation, the development of new and potent mind-warping drugs has made our laws obsolete. LSD has become a part of our national lexicon and apparently usage is increasing.

Scientists and academicians are engaged in extended investigations into just how harmful LSD and other hallucinogenic drugs may be to the human mind and genetic structure.

And while they are engaged in this very necessary investigation, the lobby of permissiveness is counseling us to do nothing until we can precisely measure the worst effects of these drugs.

I have read a great deal of testimony and background information on this subject in recent weeks, and it seems evident that we can today demonstrate that tangible damage to individuals and society results from the promiscuous use of hallucinogenic drugs, and no definable benefits result.

I can cite heinous crimes committed under the influence of LSD. I can quote statistics about temporary and permanent mind damage which is associated with LSD.

The time has come, Mr. Speaker, to at least move ahead with minimum penalties so that our law-enforcement agencies can begin a positive control program.

It may well be that we will want to modify these laws, once all of the scientific and medical evidence is in, but to hold the matter in abeyance until that time would be a disservice to the Nation.

Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing a bill which would, for the first time, give our enforcement agencies the legal tools they need to prosecute those who illicitly sell hallucinogenic drugs.

My bill also would make it unlawful to possess LSD and similar drugs except under carefully specified conditions. While I am mindful of the fact that the users should perhaps be treated more as medical patients than as lawbreakers, there clearly is a requirement for possession penalties in order to effectively control traffic in these drugs.

SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY IN BUSINESS ACT

(Mr. BROTZMAN (at the request of Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BROTZMAN. Mr. Speaker, last May 15 I was pleased to join two of my colleagues, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. DENNEY] and the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. HUNT] in introducing H.R. 9966, the Accuracy in Business Act, and a companion resolution, House Resolution 476. Subsequently, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. SMITH] introduced similar legislation in November.

Recently, we joined together in asking the chairman of the Committee on Government Operations and the chairman of the Rules Committee to hold hearings early in 1968 on these measures. These measures are designed to give the Congress better information on the inflationary impact of appropriations which we are called upon to enact.

Mr. Speaker, this proposal has attracted nationwide attention. Recently the Omaha World-Herald and the Shelbyville Indiana News carried editorials supporting this measure and Mr. DENNEY's continuing battle against the forces of inflation. I am inserting these editorials in the RECORD in the hope that other Members will take the time to read these comments and lend their support to this important proposal.

[From the Omaha World-Herald, Nov. 17, 1967]

A BUSINESSLIKE IDEA

Congressman Robert V. Denney of Nebraska is sponsoring a resolution requiring that every proposal submitted to the House of Representatives include an estimate of its cost for the next two fiscal years.

Cumulative totals would be published twice a month.

The National Federation of Independent Business reports that 82 percent of its 241 thousand members voted to support the Denney resolution. Ninety-two per cent of the Nebraska members favored it. The federation said that if every piece of legislation carried a price tag, Congressmen might vote with more concern for economy.

Mr. Denney's proposal would introduce a measure of business judgment into the deliberations of Congress. It's so sensible that we wonder why it wasn't enacted long ago.

[From the Shelbyville (Ind.) News, Oct. 31, 1967]

HOW ABOUT THE COST?

If "truth in packaging" and "truth in lending" are valid national objectives—and many people believe that they are—then it would seem that "truth in pricing legislation" is also desirable.

At least a majority—82 percent to be exact—of members of the National Federation of Independent Business, Inc., believe that if every measure introduced before the House of Representatives contained a "price tag" showing its cost to the taxpayers, then congressmen might vote with more concern for economy.

This novel approach to legislative book-keeping was proposed by Congressman Robert Denney of Nebraska. He would like to see twice-a-month tabulations on the cumulative cost of all bills and resolutions introduced, and a similar total for all legislation passed by the House.

The proposal was put to a vote of independent business proprietors by the National Federation of Independent Business, and 82 percent of the respondents registered approval of the idea, 12 percent were opposed and 6 percent were undecided.

Businessmen, usually outspoken on the subject of government spending, apparently believe the Denney proposal would be a

worthwhile step toward money management during the complex legislative process.

Aside from appropriation bills, many measures presented to Congress authorize government services and projects without any mention of costs which will result. The costs usually show up later in department appropriation bills.

Congressman Denney's measure would require that estimates of the cost for both current fiscal year and the next fiscal year be written into each piece of proposed legislation. The Clerk of the House would publish in the Congressional Record the cumulative cost figures for (1) bills and resolutions introduced, and (2) legislation passed, on the 1st and 15th of each month.

While some deficiencies may be acknowledged—an "estimate" might be far off the actual cost, and amendments could drastically alter expenditures—most businessmen would like to see the innovation.

CALIFORNIA'S MASSIVE WATER CONSERVATION PROGRAM

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. TUNNEY] is recognized for 15 minutes.

(Mr. TUNNEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Speaker, there is hardly a single Member of this body who is not in some way concerned with a water resource problem of one sort or another, be it pollution, drought, or overabundance.

In the past year or more a considerable amount of our time and attention has been focused on these nagging problems and as a result we have passed some impressive milestone legislation to combat the threat to our rivers, streams, and watersheds. These legislative efforts have been reported widely, and justifiably so, by all the news media and they, equally concerned, have done a remarkable job of arousing the public to the need for better water management practices.

Now, however, I would like to take this opportunity to speak about a relatively small, and definitely less publicized, project which is nearing completion in Hemet, Calif. With an unglamorous title of "Reverse Osmosis To Remove Dissolved Solids From Reclaimed Water Used in Ground Water Recharge Program," it may be understandable that it has received scant public attention outside California's 38th Congressional District but it has a significant purpose which should interest every one of our colleagues.

The twofold purpose of this \$300,000 research project is to find out whether, first, large flows of brackish water can be made usable continuously without tremendous waste problems, and second, the unit cost can be made reasonable. According to the scientists in charge, the capacity of the reverse osmosis desalting facility will be 50,000 gallons per day by next January.

If this pilot demineralizing plant proves efficient and economical, its lessons can not only be applied to neighboring water reclamation plants but to other communities in similar straits.

That is not the entire Hemet story, either. The Eastern Municipal Water